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//2A-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY CASE NO. DR-008 
Upon A Petition for Declaratory Ruling. 
PROSKAUER, ROSE, GOETZ & MENDELSOHN, ESQS. (M. DAVID 
ZURNDORFER, ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS, ESQS. (WALTER M. 
MEGINNISS, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECLARATORY RULING 
This matter comes to us on appeal by the Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU) from certain 
portions of a recommended declaratory ruling issued by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) in response to a petition for a declaratory ruling 
pursuant to §210 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) by the 
New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA). 
As to those portions of the Director's recommended 
declaratory ruling which are not the subject of an appeal to 
this Board, the recommended declaratory ruling is deemed 
final pursuant to §210.3 of the Rules. 
As to the matters now before us, the Board issues its 
declaratory ruling with reference to the nine distinguishable 
demands which are the subject of ATU's appeal, as follows: 
I. Common Demand 42 
All personnel on Restricted Duty shall be assigned 
work in their own Division when positions are 
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available in their own division. In the event no 
position is open in their division when assigned to 
Restricted Duty said employee will be given the 
opportunity to transfer back into their division 
when a position opens up. 
The Director found this demand to be nonmandatory 
because it would require that the NYCTA assign employees on 
restricted duty to particular vacant positions, and the 
decision to fill vacancies is a management prerogative which 
is nonmandatory, citing our decision in City of Saratoga 
Springs, 16 PERB f3058 (1983). In City of Saratoga Springs, 
we held nonmandatory a demand that "newly created and vacant 
positions shall be filled . . . immediately." We so found 
because it is a management prerogative for an employer to 
determine whether or not it will fill vacant positions. 
The ATU argues in its exceptions that our decisions in 
City of Schenectady, 21 PERB ^3022 (1988), and Niskayuna PBA, 
14 PERB 53067 (1981), are controlling here, because the 
demand may properly be interpreted as reposing in the NYCTA 
the authority to decide if positions are "open" or 
"available". In those cases we determined that, so long as 
the decision to fill vacancies continues to rest with the 
employer, demands which would establish a preference in 
assignments of employees on the basis of seniority are 
mandatory. (See City of Schenectady, supra, at 3050.) 
Notwithstanding the ATU's contentions, it is our 
determination that Common Demand 42 is reasonably read as 
limiting the discretion of the NYCTA to determine whether 
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positions are "available" and when a position "opens up" to 
persons on restricted duty. The demand thus may be construed 
to divest management of the right to determine whether 
positions may be filled by persons on restricted duty, and, 
indeed, whether they will be filled at all. It accordingly 
goes beyond the scope asserted by the ATU of establishing 
nothing more than an in-division preference in the assignment 
of restricted duty employees and requiring transfer of such 
employees who work out-of-division back to their former 
division when positions "open up" there. Because the demand 
seeks to compel the NYCTA to fill positions as well as to 
grant division preference in the filling of restricted duty 
assignments, it is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation in 
keeping with our decision in City of Saratoga Springs, supra. 
II. Common Demand 47 
Add the following sentence to Management's Rights: 
"provided that management *s exercise of the rights 
stated herein shall not conflict with any provision 
of this Agreement and shall be consistent with its 
duties under the Taylor Law." 
The Director found Common Demand 47 to be nonmandatory 
because it does nothing more than require particular 
compliance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). We read the demand somewhat differently. The demand 
seeks to limit the scope of the management rights clause. 
One such limitation would make it clear that the ATU does not 
waive, in agreeing to the management rights clause, any 
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Taylor Law right which it may have to negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment. We, accordingly, do not construe 
the demand as merely seeking language which is redundant or 
duplicative of the Act, but construe it, instead, as an 
effort by the ATU to assure that the management rights clause 
will not be alleged to constitute a contractual waiver of 
Taylor Law rights which would otherwise exist. Since we have 
previously held that such a waiver may take place if it is 
knowing, intentional and unambiguous, 1/ we find that this 
demand constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
III. Common Demand 62 
Demand 62(a) 
The supplementary fund and program of health and 
welfare benefits now provided must be substantially 
increased in order to sufficiently underwrite the 
current necessary medical expenses. 
Demand 62(b) 
A contribution shall be made to the Health Benefit 
Trust for employees retiring after April 1, 1988, 
their dependents, and for surviving spouses to 
provide the following benefits. 
1. Major Medical 
2. Prescription Drugs 
3. Vision Care 
4. Schedule of Allowance Payments to reflect 1988 
schedule, and adjusted to reflect future 
increases in Schedule of Allowance payments. 
i/see, e.g., CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D. 2d 685, 15 PERB 
5[7011 (3d Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 
PERB ^7020 (1982). 
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5. Medicare reimbursement-retiree and spouse; 
premium paid in full. 
Demand 62(c) 
An equity fund will be created and administered by 
the Health Benefit Trust Fund for the purpose of 
improving the programs administered by the Health 
Benefit Trust. Said Health Benefit Trust Funds 
1988, a lump sum amount. 
As the Director found, the subsections of Demand 62 are 
separable demands, and separate determinations may 
accordingly be made concerning the duty to negotiate each. 
However, the parties both acknowledge that the Health Benefit 
Trust Fund referenced in Demands 62(a), (b) and (c) has in 
the past, and may in the future, include retirees. The 
Director found all three demands to be nonmandatory because, 
y 
as applied, they include retirees, who are not members of the 
bargaining unit represented by the ATU, and who are not 
therefore properly persons on whose behalf bargaining demands 
may be made. While it is true, as contended by the ATU, that 
Demands 62(a) and 62(c) do not specifically refer to 
retirees, 62(a) refers to programs and benefits "now 
provided" without limitation, and 62(c) refers to "the 
programs administered by the Health Benefit Trust", again 
without limitation to those programs applicable to unit 
personnel. The programs which are the subject of the ATU's 
demands are properly deemed to cover also individuals who are 
not unit employees (i.e., retirees). We accordingly find 
l that Demands 62(a) and 62(c) are nonmandatory subjects of 
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negotiation. Demand 62(b) is also, as found by the Director, 
nonmandatory because it makes explicit reference to retirees 
and may apply to persons who retire beyond the term of the 
collective bargaining agreement at issue. See, e.cr. , Troy 
UFFA, Local 2304, IAFF, 10 PERB 53015 (1977). 
IV. Common Demand 72 
The Authority may not enter into any contract, or 
enter into any other arrangement, which would 
require or permit individuals who are not TA 
employees covered by this agreement to perform work 
on TA property which is work that covered employees 
can and have performed, or to perform work on 
buses, or any other equipment owned or leased by 
the TA which is work that covered employees can and 
have performed. 
In any case where the TA desires to enter into a 
contract to have work done which is of a kind or 
would serve a function that once could have been 
and was done by covered employees, but which the TA 
desires be done with skills in which employees have 
no training, the TA must undertake to train 
employees to do the work desired as soon as it 
begins to plan the work. It may only subcontract 
such work where emergency conditions make timely 
training of its own employees to do work 
impossible. 
The Farming Out Committees will be retained so as to 
review TA contract to assure compliance with this 
provision. 
The Director found this demand to be nonmandatory upon 
the ground that it seeks to preclude subcontracting of work 
which has not historically been exclusively unit work. As we 
found in Somers Faculty Ass'n, 9 PERB f3014 (1976), and Local 
No. 650, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 9 PERB 53015 (1976), a demand which 
seeks to prevent the subcontracting of work performed by unit 
employees is a mandatory subject of negotiation. This 
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demand, however, is not limited to protection of what is unit 
work, but is reasonably read as requiring restoration of work 
no longer performed by ATU unit employees and perhaps now 
being performed by NYCTA personnel in other units. It is not 
necessary that such work be exclusively unit work, but it 
must at least involve what is currently unit work for the 
demand to be a mandatory subject of negotiation. The fact 
that the ATU, in the instant demand, seeks to prevent the 
NYCTA from subcontracting what is no longer unit work (i.e., 
it only need have been unit work at some time in the past) 
renders the demand nonmandatory. 
The second paragraph of Common Demand 72 is nonmandatory 
because it requires the NYCTA to conduct training, a matter 
which we have previously found to be a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation.^/ The third paragraph of the demand is 
appropriately read to refer back to the first paragraph, and 
removal of the first paragraph renders it meaningless. 
Accordingly, the third paragraph of Common Demand 72 is also 
declared to be a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
V. Separate Demand 49 
The authority will purchase an insurance policy 
covering all costs for special welfare benefits 
which exceed in a calendar year the sum to be 
agreed upon in bargaining. All claims on the 
special welfare plan in excess of that sum to be 
paid by the insurance company. 
^/citv of Mount Vernon, 18 PERB ?[3020 (1985) (extent of 
training deemed a qualification for employment). 
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The Director found this demand to be nonmandatory 
because the benefits referred to have and do apply to 
retirees (see discussion of Demands 62(a), (b) and (c), 
supra). While, as we have found with respect to Common 
Demands 62(a) and (c), Separate Demand 49 makes no explicit 
mention of application to retirees, the fact that this demand 
refers, without limitation, to "all costs for special welfare 
benefits" and "all claims on the special welfare plan" 
(emphases added), together with the acknowledgment of the 
parties that retirees are in fact covered persons under the 
plan, renders the demand nonmandatory. 
The Board therefore declares Common Demand 42, Common 
Demands 62(a), (b) and (c), Common Demand 72 and Separate 
Demand 49 to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and 
declares Common Demand 47 to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2B-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
____T.____.a-nd__..-....^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF THE STATE 
COMPTROLLER) , 
Respondent. 
KURT T. MINERSAGEN, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ., General Counsel 
(LAUREN DE SOLE, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO 
(PEF) excepts to the conditional dismissal, by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation, 
of its improper practice charge against the State of New York 
(Office of the State Comptroller) (State). The charge, as 
amended, 1/ alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act when it unilaterally eliminated its past practice of 
reimbursing unit employees for sales taxes paid on out-of-
state lodging which exceeded the parties' contractual lodging 
allowance. The State, in its defense to the charge, asserts 
I/At the pre-hearing conference conducted by the 
Assistant Director, PEF withdrew so much of its charge as 
alleged a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act), and it is not now before us. 
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that the matter is covered by Article 8 of the parties1 1988-
91 collective bargaining agreement, and that there is pending 
at arbitration a contract grievance filed by PEF which 
challenges the actions of the State which are the subject of 
The Assistant Director conditionally dismissed the 
charge based upon the reasoning of this Board in Herkimer 
County BOCES. 20 PERB H3050 (1987). We there held, at 3109, 
that where, as here, the subject of an improper practice 
charge has also been made the subject of a grievance under a 
grievance procedure which ends in binding arbitration, and an 
issue exists concerning whether the parties• agreement covers 
j the matter raised by the charge: "[I]t is appropriate to 
defer deciding whether §205.5(d) of the Act precludes the 
exercise of jurisdiction by PERB, pending the outcome of the 
grievance which has been filed". Section 205.5(d) of the Act 
provides that PERB "shall not have authority to enforce an 
agreement between an employer and an employee organization 
and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation 
of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper employer or employee organization practice." 
We thus held in Herkimer County BOCES, supra, that, in 
those instances in which a dispute exists between the parties 
concerning whether their collective bargaining agreement 
covers the issue addressed in the improper practice charge, 
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and a contract grievance is pending, PERB will defer to the 
grievance procedure, pending a determination whether or not 
the issue raised in both the charge and the grievance is 
covered by the collective bargaining agreement, and, thus, 
bargaining table, the right to negotiate further on the 
issue. Pursuant to that decision and policy, the Assistant 
Director conditionally dismissed the charge pending the 
outcome of PEF's contract grievance. 
Notwithstanding the exceptions of PEF, we agree with the 
Assistant Director that the reasoning and standards contained 
in Herkimer County BOCES, supra, are at least equally 
J applicable here. Indeed, PEF argues, in its brief before us: 
The grievance alleges that the State 
changed its long-standing past practice 
dating at least to 1976 and violated 
Article 8 of the contract by denying 
reimbursement of sales tax paid on out-
of-state lodging costs when the sales tax 
causes the lodging charge to exceed the 
maximum allowed for reimbursement. 
By asserting, in the context of the contract grievance, a 
violation of past practice, the issues raised by the 
grievance share a virtual identity with the claim of 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, which relies upon a 
claim of unilateral change in a past practice affecting terms 
and conditions of employment for its basis. 
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As pointed out by the State in its brief, the issue sought 
to be adjudicated by PEF in both the grievance forum and before 
PERB is the same, whether the State has the right to deny 
reimbursement of sales tax paid on out-of-state lodging costs, 
-when- the sales tax charge exceeds-the: -maximum-allowabl-e- rate-: -
established by the parties1 agreement. Also, in both forums, PEF 
seeks a "continuation of the past practice and the making whole 
of employees denied reimbursement for out-of-state sales tax 
exceeding the maximum allowable rates of reimbursement for 
lodging." The grievance and charge thus both seek to establish 
a unilateral change in past practice and the same remedy. 
Under the circumstances, the decision of the Assistant 
Director conditionally dismissing the charge and affording to PEF 
the opportunity to file a timely motion at the conclusion of the 
contract grievance procedure to reopen the charge upon the ground 
that the jurisdictional limitations contained in §205.5(d) of the 
Act do not apply to its charge is affirmed in its entirety. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed subject to the foregoing conditions. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman", Chairman 'Harold R. ] 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#20-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
( ) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES H. GRAF, 
Charging Party, 
__.___- a. Ha.-^__ :^^^^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK (MANHATTAN DEVELOPMENTAL 
CENTER) and NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
JAMES H. GRAF, pro se 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (WILLIAM P. SEAMON, ESQ, 
of Counsel) , for New York State Public Employees 
Federation, AFL-CIO 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of James H. 
Graf to the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) of his improper 
practice charge against the State of New York (Manhattan 
Developmental Center) (State) and the New York State Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). 
Graf alleges that the State is in violation of 
§§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by, first, evading its contractual 
obligations concerning five grievances filed by Graf, and 
exerting improper influence upon PEF to suppress and obstruct 
I the processing of the grievances; second, by terminating his 
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; 
employment on December 13, 1988, in violation of State and 
Federal civil rights laws, affirmative action policies and 
New York State's Whistle Blower Law; and, third, by engaging 
in a 24-hour-a-day program of high-tech psychological torture 
-------^ 
illegal broadcast of audio signals, sleep deprivation, and 
other acts. 
Graf further alleges that, as to PEF, a violation of 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act occurred when it failed to represent 
him properly in connection with the disciplinary charges 
pending against him, when the counsel assigned by PEF to 
represent him withdrew from his case, and when PEF failed to 
) assign another attorney to represent him. 
The Director dismissed the charge against the State upon 
the ground that Graf's factually unsupported allegations 
failed to establish a violation of the Act. Addressing each 
of the three sets of allegations against the State in turn, 
we find as follows. 
I. Evasion of contractual responsibility and 
use of improper influence to suppress and 
obstruct contract grievance process. 
Three of the five grievances referenced by Graf in his 
charge were filed in 1985 and 1986, and no action was taken 
upon them after 1986. PERB's Rules of Procedure-^ / (Rules) 
require that a charge be filed within four months of the 
i/Rules, §204.1(a). 
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improper practice alleged, and we find, at the outset, that 
as to these grievances, the charge is untimely, since more 
than four months have elapsed since the State (and PEF) 
allegedly failed to timely process and/or pursue them. 
- - - - - ~ ~ ~ ™ ~ ™ - - ^ 
to have been ignored by the State, we find that the failure 
to timely process these grievances would amount to nothing 
more than a contract violation, if any, and does not give 
rise to a claim of repudiation of the collective bargaining 
agreement between PEP and the State such as to establish the 
existence of a claim of violation of §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act.-2/ Neither can such factual assertions properly support 
J an inference that it was the State's intent to improperly 
dominate or interfere with the internal operations of PEF. 
[Act, §209-a.l(b)]. We accordingly affirm the Director's 
dismissal of the charge against the State in these regards. 
II. Termination in violation of State and 
Federal law and policy. 
Graf's assertions that he was terminated from his 
employment with the State in violation of civil rights and 
other laws are not matters which, even if proven, fall within 
our jurisdiction and remedial powers. PERB's jurisdiction is 
limited to determinations concerning whether discriminatory 
action has been taken in retaliation for engagement in 
^/sewanhaka CHSD. 22 PERB [^3041 (July 11, 1989) ; Addison CSD, 
17 PERB 13076, aff 'a 17 PERB ?[4566 (1984) . 
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activities specifically protected by the Act, such as 
engagement in employee organizational activity (Act, §202). 
Graf's allegation that he has been discriminated against in 
violation of State and Federal civil rights laws does not 
- - - --^ 
the Act, and the charge was, accordingly, properly dismissed 
in this regard • •3-/ 
III. Psychological torture. 
Similarly, we dismiss the portion of Graf's charge which 
alleges that the State has engaged in systematic "high-tech 
psychological torture". We find no cognizable claim of 
violation of the Act to exist. Aside from the failure to 
present any factual allegations in support of this claim, we 
conclude that the invasions of personal privacy, tampering 
with mail, illegal broadcasts of audio signals, audio and 
video surveillance in Graf's home and other allegations 
might, if factual, set forth civil rights or criminal law 
violations, but that this Board is without jurisdiction to 
decide such claims. We accordingly find that the Director 
properly dismissed all of the charges against the State in 
their entirety. 
We now turn to the allegations made by Graf against PEF, 
concerning breach of the duty of fair representation. In 
•2/See, e.g. , United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
16 PERB f3062 (1983). 
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response to the claim that he was abandoned by PEF's counsel 
and denied further representation in connection with his 
disciplinary grievance, PEF asserts that, although it indeed 
withdrew from representation of Graf, it did so based upon 
-h-is-conduet- in refus^ ^^  
defense in a meaningful way, together with the deterioration 
in the attorney-client relationship acknowledged by both 
parties. Regardless of the merit of these respective claims, 
we find that the failure of the charging party to make any 
factual allegations supporting a claim of arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or bad faith withdrawal of representation 
warrants dismissal of the charge against PEF. 4/ 
We have reviewed the remaining exceptions to the 
Director's decision, and find them to be without merit. 
5/ 
^/Graf's assertions notwithstanding, no absolute duty to 
represent exists, and there is nothing per se improper in an 
employee organization declining representation in a specific 
case, in the absence of evidence that such declination is 
arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith. 
•^/Notwithstanding Graf's assertions to the contrary, the 
Director is not obligated to conduct a hearing prior to 
dismissal of an improper practice charge, if a finding is 
made, as here, that PERB is without jurisdiction over the 
allegations of the charge and/or that the charge fails to 
make allegations, which if proven at a hearing, would 
establish a violation of the Act. 
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Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
U**te-?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member. 
//2D-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO BOARD OF EDUCATION PROFESSIONAL, 
CLERICAL, TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . . . . . . _ . - r — - • : . - - - • ~ r - - - _ : - ^ 
-and- CASE NO. U-9767 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
SARGENT, REPKA & COVERT, P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, 
ESQ., and JAMES L. JARVIS, JR., ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
HODGSON, RUSS, ANDREWS, WOODS & GOODYEAR (KARL W. 
\ KRISTOFF, ESQ., and ELENA CACAVAS, ESQ., of 
_./ Counsel) , for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Buffalo Board of Education Professional, Clerical, 
Technical Employees Association (PCTEA) excepts to the 
dismissal of its improper practice charge against the Board 
of Education of the City School District of the City of 
Buffalo (District), which alleges that the District violated 
§§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when, on September 9, 1987, it unilaterally 
upgraded the contractual salary schedules of three unit 
members. The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
dismissed the charge upon the ground that PCTEA waived its 
right to file an improper practice charge by filing a 
) 
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contract grievance, which (although later withdrawn) 
triggered an election of forums pursuant to Article 23, 
Section 2(h) of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
That Article provides as follows: 
- - •—•-- ••----.--- •_— --:- •:-- -j. f-an -empioyee~and/or -the=--Uiid^n--submits—a------:-—•• •=-• •- ---.—.^ r:---. ——-•— 
grievance pursuant to this Agreement, 
neither the employee nor the Union can 
simultaneously or thereafter make the 
occurrence which has been grieved the 
subject of a proceeding before any other 
administrative, judicial or legislative 
tribunal. An occurrence which is or has 
been the subject of a proceeding before 
any administrative, judicial or 
legislative tribunal cannot be grieved. 
There being no dispute that PCTEA filed a contract 
grievance concerning the upgrade in salary schedules of the 
j three unit members also at issue in the improper practice 
charge before her, the ALJ concluded that a grievance had 
been "submitted", even though later withdrawn, and that the 
foregoing contract language constituted a clear, unambiguous 
and explicit waiver of the right to both file a contract 
grievance and an improper practice charge before this Board. 
The ALJ further determined that no legal impediment existed 
to the agreement by PCTEA to the election of forums contained 
in the collective bargaining agreement, and, accordingly, 
found that a waiver of the right to file a charge had 
occurred. 
PCTEA excepts to the ALJ decision on numerous grounds. 
First, it asserts that the parties are prohibited by statute, 
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I , 
decisional law and/or public policy from negotiating an 
agreement which would preclude the exercise of jurisdiction 
by this Board over what would otherwise constitute an 
improper practice charge. PCTEA cites, in support of its 
• - - - - - " • - - ' - - - • • - - • " - • — - " ^ 
"exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction" over improper practice 
charges. PCTEA further asserts that, notwithstanding the 
election of forum provision of the parties* collective 
bargaining agreement, PERB should exercise jurisdiction in 
this matter, because the charge alleges a §209-a.l(a) 
violation, a type of violation which PERB has not 
traditionally deferred to arbitration. 
PCTEA's third exception asserts that the evidence fails 
to support a finding that it knowingly, intentionally and 
unmistakably waived its right to file an improper practice 
charge with PERB. Its fourth, related, exception alleges 
that, because its grievance was withdrawn following its 
filing, and was not ultimately litigated pursuant to the 
grievance procedure, the effect of the dismissal of the 
instant improper practice charge is a denial of access to any 
forum, rather than an election of a forum in which all issues 
arising out of the occurrence can be fully and finally 
litigated, in violation of the intent and language of the 
contract. 
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Exceptions three and four turn upon resolution of 
evidentiary questions. The ALT found the contract language 
at issue to be sufficiently clear and unambiguous to 
establish that PCTEA agreed at the bargaining table that "An 
- occurrence—which-lras^een=grieved-[>d:li^ 
of a proceeding before any other administrative, judicial or 
legislative tribunal." It is our finding that the ALJ 
correctly construed the clear language of the contractual 
provision to constitute an election of forums by PCTEA. We 
further find that the ALJ correctly interpreted the 
"submission" of a grievance as its filing and as the point at 
which the election of forums is made pursuant to this 
language. The ALT also correctly concluded that the language 
of the agreement compels the finding that the later 
withdrawal of the grievance has no effect upon the election 
earlier made. Both exception three and exception four are 
accordingly denied, and the determinations of the ALT with 
respect to the meaning and effect of the contract language 
are affirmed. 
We now turn to the issues raised by PCTEA in its first 
two exceptions. PCTEA asserts, first, that an agreement 
which "would foreclose PERB from considering an improper 
practice charge" is unenforceable because it relates to a 
prohibited subject of bargaining based upon statute 
(§205.5(d) of the Act), decisional law (citing Cohoes CSD v. 
Board - U-9767 -5 
Cohoes Teachers Association, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 53, 
9 PERB 57529 (1976) and other cases), and public policy. 
While it is certainly true that §205.5(d) of the Act confers 
"exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction" upon PERB for the 
not construed this language to mean that parties may not 
waive rights conferred by the Act. For example, in Sachem 
CSD, 21 PERB f3021 (1988), we dismissed a charge upon the 
ground that the charging party had waived, by contract, its 
right to negotiate concerning terms and conditions of 
employment not covered by its collective bargaining agreement 
with the respondent school district until the commencement of 
negotiations for a successor agreement. If a party may, by 
contract, waive a substantive Taylor Law right, such as the 
right to negotiate terms and conditions of employment, we 
perceive no reason why parties may not also waive the right 
to proceed both under a grievance procedure and before PERB 
simultaneously with respect to the same issue. We thus 
construe the parties * agreement in the instant case not as 
divesting PERB of jurisdiction, but as establishing an 
election of forums which, once exercised, gives rise to a 
waiver of the right to proceed in an alternative forum, 
i/indeed, in Williamsville CSD, 8 PERB J3061 (1975), although 
we declined to dismiss an improper practice charge upon an 
election of forums ground, we did so not because such an 
election would be improper, but because the election was not 
effectuated in fact. 
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including PERB. PERB's jurisdiction is thus unaffected by a 
contractual waiver by a party of the right to file a charge 
before us. 
In Professional Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 
bargain concerning inclusion in a collective bargaining 
agreement of language which would reiterate certain of the 
protections of the Act and create a contractual remedy for 
statutory wrongs. We held, at 3082, such a demand to be a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiations, "[i]n view of the 
availability of a prescribed statutory method for resolving 
improper practices, and an expressed legislative purpose to 
1
 ' vest solely in this Board the application of that method . . . ." 
In.that case, it was necessary only for us to determine that 
the at-issue proposal was not a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. To the extent that it may be construed as 
establishing that the creation of a contractual forum for 
violations of the Act is not merely nonmandatory, but is 
prohibited, we decline to follow it.-2-/ The language at issue 
in the instant case, may, in keeping with the principle 
enunciated in Professional Firefighters Association, supra, 
%J PCTEA aptly points out that in that case, in dicta, we 
stated the following: "While the proposal would not, as it 
indeed could not under the Law, preclude the filing of an 
improper practice charge with this Board, it would provide 
direct access to the grievance procedure and to arbitration 
) as an alternative recourse." (at 3082). 
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be nonmandatory, but we decline to find that it is a 
prohibited subject of negotiations under the Act or that it 
contravenes public policy. In any event, the circumstances 
which gave rise to the dicta language of that case is 
------distinguishable ^ from^ 
the contract language does not preclude the filing of an 
improper practice charge, but merely requires the grievant or 
PCTEA to elect to proceed either with a contract grievance or 
before PERB. The election rested with PCTEA, and it chose to 
file a contract grievance in lieu of an improper practice 
charge. It is not necessary for us to decide here whether an 
absolute bar to the filing of improper practice charges 
) pursuant to agreement would be enforceable or not. 
PCTEA also cites to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
in Cohoes CSD v. Cohoes Teachers Association, supraf in 
support of the proposition that contract language which 
delegates to another entity decision-making which is vested 
by statute in a party is unenforceable. In Cohoes, the Court 
of Appeals refused to enforce an arbitration award which 
granted tenure to a probationary teacher pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement which prohibited the 
termination of teachers without just cause. The Court held 
that a provision in an agreement which would divest the Board 
of Education of its statutory authority and responsibility to 
make tenure decisions is unenforceable. PCTEA argues that 
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recognition by PERB of a waiver of the right to proceed both 
under a contractual grievance procedure and before it 
constitutes, in essence, an improper delegation or abnegation 
of our jurisdiction. We disagree. While, as we held in 
----------^ -^iPro-f-essi^  
require parties to bargain concerning creation of a 
contractual remedy for violations of the Act, if parties 
choose to so negotiate, we construe their actions as 
constituting nothing more than a waiver of a statutory right 
to file a charge and not as a divestiture of our 
jurisdiction. We find no public policy, statutory or 
decisional law basis upon which it must be or should be said 
J that PCTEA is not bound by its agreement. Its exception in 
this regard is denied. 
Finally, we turn to PCTEA's argument that, because of 
the particular nature of the violation of the Act alleged 
(that is, a §209-a.l(a) violation), our policy against 
deferring such cases to arbitration should be extended to 
reject a waiver of the right to file a subsection "a" charge 
here. While it is indeed true that we have declined to defer 
subsection "a" cases to arbitration, 
3/ 
we have done so in 
circumstances in which the charge is properly before us. In 
contrast, the instant charge is not properly before us 
•2/see, e.g. , Connetquot CSD. 19 PERB ^3045 (1986) ; Addison 
) CSD, 17 PERB [^3 076 (1984) . 
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because PCTEA waived its right to file by its act of filing a 
contract grievance relating to the same issue of payments 
above the salary schedule to three unit members. It is 
accordingly unnecessary for us to reach the question whether, 
T?f ^ ~^ri^va^n^e~"were:^ow~~ 
properly before us, deferral would be appropriate. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that PCTEA exercised 
an election of forums and, in doing so, waived its right to 
file a charge before PERB. We decline to declare such an 
election unenforceable and, accordingly, decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over the instant charge. The decision of the 
ALJ is therefore affirmed, and the charge is dismissed in its 
entirety. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Chairman / Harold R. Newman, 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member^ 
//2E-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of-
JAMESVILLE-DEWITT FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, AFT #2755, 
Charging Party, 
:^:--:::::"'=: ^ ^ " T ^ ^ 7—-::::--- CASE ^ NO ^ ^U~3;02 6 9 ^ " ^ -
JAMESVILLE-DEWITT CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
HELEN W. BEALE, for Charging Party 
GARRY A. LUKE, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Jamesville-DeWitt Faculty Association, New York State United 
Teachers, AFT #2755 (Association) to an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) decision upholding, in part, an improper practice 
charge alleging that the Jamesville-DeWitt Central School 
District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to take a 
ratification vote on a tentative agreement reached by the 
parties. Although finding that no ratification vote was 
taken, the ALJ refused to find that the failure resulted in a 
waiver of the right to conduct a ratification vote, and 
directed, as remedial relief, that the District's Board of 
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Education (Board) conduct a ratification vote. The District 
has not excepted to the ALJ decision. 
The Association's exceptions fall into two categories. 
First, the Association raises procedural objections to the 
claims that the ALJ recommended at the pre-hearing conference 
to the Association representatives that the charge be 
withdrawn based upon the information then before her; that 
undue delay in the processing of the charge took place; that 
a copy of the ALJ decision was erroneously sent to the 
Association president and the District Superintendent rather 
than only to the parties' designated representatives; that a 
J motion for particularization made by the Association was 
improperly denied; and that the ALJ erroneously overruled an 
objection made by the Association to the use of leading 
questions. Second, the Association objects to the ALJ's 
substantive holdings that the District's Superintendent, who 
also serves as its chief negotiator, did not fail to 
affirmatively support the tentative agreement and that the 
remedy of directing a ratification vote adequately redresses 
the violation found. We will take each of these matters in 
turn. 
Assuming it to be true that the ALJ recommended to the 
Association that it withdraw its charge based upon the 
information presented at the pre-hearing conference, there is 
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no claim whatsoever that such a recommendation was based upon 
anything other than the ALJ's good faith application of the 
relevant case law to the facts before her, representing a 
preliminary evaluation of the merits of the charge. This 
which PERB expects its AKTs to perform in the course of pre-
hearing conferences in an effort to avoid unnecessary 
litigation of charges which either lack merit or warrant 
settlement.i/ It is, in any event, quite apparent that the 
ALJ based her decision and recommended order solely upon the 
evidence presented at the hearing and made a de novo 
determination, upholding, at least in part, the Association's 
) claims, and establishing without doubt the absence of 
prejudice and bias on the part of the ALJ. This exception is 
accordingly denied. 
With respect to the issue of delay in the processing of 
the charge, the record discloses that the charge was filed on 
July 14, 1988, and that the Association representatives would 
not be available for a pre-hearing conference or hearing on 
numerous dates between July 25 and August 29, 1988. The pre-
hearing conference was in fact conducted on August 18, 1988, 
at which time a motion for particularization filed by the 
-1/The form letter sent to all parties announces that "[t]he 
purpose of the conference is to assist the parties in 
settling the matter or, in the alternative, to clarify the 
issues and obtain stipulations of fact." 
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Association was discussed. By letter dated September 12, 
1988, the ALJ confirmed the discussions which took place at 
the pre-hearing conference and formally denied the motion for 
particularization. The September 12 letter requested that 
statements contained therein. Thereafter, by letter dated 
October 13, 1988, the matter was scheduled for hearing on 
December 14. Briefs were filed, by agreement of the parties, 
on February 10, 1989, and a decision was mailed to the 
parties by May 31, 1989. While this Board and its staff 
continually seek to achieve improvements in the speed with 
which cases are handled, the time frame within which this 
) matter was handled before the ALJ was reasonable and 
necessitated by staff workload. This exception is 
accordingly denied. 
The claim that the ALJ evidenced bias by forwarding 
copies of the decision and recommended order directly to the 
parties in addition to their representatives is totally 
lacking in merit. ALJs do not perform the task of mailing 
decisions and it is patently absurd for the Association to 
suggest that sending copies of the decision to both parties 
was directed by the ALJ and "reflect[s] a bias against the 
charging party and an abuse of the process." The exception 
is denied. 
i 
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We turn now to the portion of the Association's 
exceptions which assert that the ALT erroneously denied it * s 
motion for particularization. We have reviewed the charge, 
the answer filed by the District, and the motion for 
•:-^ i---—par-t-icuiariza-tionT~and^  
The motion for particularization represents nothing more than 
a discovery device, seeking responses to questions like the 
following: 
When and where was the Board of Education 
presented with the written initialed 
agreements? Please identify (by name and 
position) all persons who attended such 
meeting. What was said and who said it? 
As §204.3(d) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) clearly 
states, a motion for particularization of an answer is 
appropriate only: 
If the statement of facts supporting any 
affirmative defense is believed by a 
charging party to be so vague and 
indefinite that such charging party 
cannot reasonably be expected to address 
them in an expeditious manner at a 
hearing. 
The District's answer in this matter is clear and concise, 
admitting and denying the specific allegations of the charge, 
and raising four affirmative defenses which are clearly 
understood to establish that the District contended either 
that the actions of the Board constituted a "vote" or, 
alternatively, that a specific "vote" was not required by the 
ratification procedure agreed upon by the parties. The 
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District's affirmative defenses are, without question, 
sufficiently unambiguous to enable the Association to proceed 
at the hearing in an expeditious manner. Indeed, at no point 
during the hearing process did the Association assert that it 
presentation of defense evidence which surprised or confused 
the Association. This exception is denied as meritless. 
Finally, we address the Association's exception which 
alleges that the AKT improperly overruled objections to the 
use of leading questions by the District representative in 
examining District witnesses. We have carefully reviewed the 
record in this regard, and find only one question to which an 
) Association representative objected, and which the A1J 
overruled. That question appears in the following context: 
Q. The communication that you sent out to the Board 
prior to your meeting with them on June 6th, do you 
recall indicating to them that you reached a 
tentative agreement with the Association? 
A. Tentative agreement, yes. 
Q. Did you identify the length of that agreement? 
A. Yes 
Q. And that would have been — 
A. Two years 
Q. Did you identify the other items agreed upon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it specifically "we've agreed upon other items" 
or "here are the other items we agreed upon" with a 
) little explanation thereafter; a summary? 
Board - U-10269 
MS. BEALE: He's leading the witness. I'm 
objecting to the characterization. 
LAW JUDGE: There's been a lot of leading of 
witnesses throughout this entire proceeding. I'll 
allow the question. 
—---:-•: --v. :•-^ •--MR^ =^ :IJU-KE-^ r^ ^^ D-i-d•.--y:J^ u_--g.etT. an- a n s w e r ? - . .-"Read—the-— -----_•--—-
question back. 
(Pending question read) 
THE WITNESS: My answer is that there was a summary 
of the items that were tentatively agreed to at the 
table. 
MR. LUKE: I have nothing further. 
LAW JUDGE: Do you have any recross? 
MS. BEALE: No. 
LAW JUDGE: You're excused. 
It is our determination that the ALT acted within her 
discretion in overruling the objection to the particular 
question to which the Association representative objected and 
we do not construe the question and answer to have a 
prejudicial effect upon the Association's case. The 
exception is denied. 
In its exceptions to the merits of the ALT decision and 
recommended order, the Association asserts that the ALT erred 
in failing to find that it alleged in its charge and proved 
at the hearing that the District's Superintendent failed to 
support the tentative agreement reached between the parties 
and affirmatively seek ratification of the agreement, as 
; 
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required by the Act.-2/ The Association also asserts that, 
having found that the District failed to conduct a 
ratification vote as required by the parties* ground rules, 
the ALJ erred in failing to find that the District waived its 
We agree with the finding of the ALJ that the District 
failed to conduct a ratification vote, as required by the 
parties* ground rules. However, we construe this failure not 
simply as a technical failure to conduct a formal vote, but 
as a failure to engage in the ratification process 
contemplated by and preceding a vote. There is no doubt that 
Superintendent of Schools Spanneut, who acted as the chief 
) negotiator on behalf of the District, engaged in discussions 
with the Board of Education of the District concerning a 
proposed agreement, nor is there any doubt that Dr. Spanneut 
affirmatively recommended support of the proposed agreement. 
There is also no doubt that the Board consensus was that the 
proposed agreement was not acceptable and that the Board 
suggested to Dr. Spanneut that negotiations continue. We 
nevertheless find that the discussions which took place did 
not amount to ratification or rejection of a tentative signed 
agreement within the meaning of the parties' ground rules and 
common practice for the following reasons. Pursuant to the 
2/s_ee, e.g. , City of Saratoga Springs, 20 PERB f3031 (1987) , 
, and cases cited at footnote 6 therein. 
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Association and District representatives1 agreement, there 
were to be two meetings, on June 6 and June 20; at the first, 
the Superintendent would present the tentative agreement and 
explain it, and then, at the second meeting, the Board would 
-conduct-a--ratification voteT-" However^74;he: minutes ^ of^he=~~~-
Board meetings for both of those dates reflect only that the 
Board went "to executive session to discuss negotiations." 
The minutes reflect no acknowledgment that negotiations had 
been completed and that ratification of the signed proposed 
agreement was the issue pending before the Board in contrast 
to the procedure which had been followed by the District in 
prior years wherein a clear "approval" vote was conducted and 
reflected in meeting minutes. Second, the Superintendent 
testified that although he provided to the Board members a 
summary of the proposed items to be contained in an 
agreement, he did not provide a copy of the signed agreement, 
nor did he inform the Board members that he had, on behalf of 
the District, entered into and signed a tentative agreement 
with the Association. Indeed, the testimony of the 
District's witnesses establishes nothing more than that the 
Superintendent was seeking input from the Board with respect 
to the handling of negotiations. We construe the term 
"ratification" to include at least the following elements: 
first, the ratifying body must be aware that negotiations 
have been completed and that its negotiating representatives 
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have reached an agreement subject only to ratification; 
second, while members of the ratifying body may have and 
communicate differing reasons for voting to ratify or reject 
the agreement, the agreement is ratified or rejected as a 
representatives must (with certain limited exceptions) 
affirmatively support ratification; and fourth, a 
ratification decision must be clearly and unequivocally made 
and communicated. 
In the instant case, the record establishes that the 
Board did not perceive its role at its meetings of June 6 and 
June 20, 1988 as engaging in ratification and a vote thereon. 
Instead, it declined to adopt the Superintendent's 
recommendation concerning how negotiations should be 
concluded and directed him to continue in his efforts. 
Having failed to abide by its ground rule requiring 
ratification, we affirm the ALJ's finding that the District 
violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. We find, however, that the 
remedial relief recommended by the ALJ does not adequately 
redress the violation found. The parties agreed, at the 
behest of the District, that "Written items agreed to at the 
table will be subject to ratification by the Board of 
Education and the JDFA". The failure of the District to make 
a ratification decision results in the waiver of its right to 
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do s o . ^ The appropriate remedy under these circumstances is 
that the District be directed, at the request of the 
Association, to execute the collective bargaining agreement 
reached by the parties on May 24, 1988. 
1. Execute, upon the request of the Jamesville-DeWitt 
Faculty Association, New York State United Teachers, AFT 
#2755, a collective bargaining agreement, effective 
July 1, 1988 to June 30, 1990, embodying the agreement 
reached by the parties on May 24, 1988; 
2. Negotiate in good faith under the Act with the 
Jamesville-DeWitt Faculty Association, New York State 
United Teachers, AFT #2755; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations used by it for written communications to 
members of the bargaining unit represented by the 
Jamesville-DeWitt Faculty Association, New York 
State United Teachers, AFT #2755. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman ^ ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
•^/see City of Saratoga Springs, supra, and Union Springs 
Central School Teachers Ass'n., 6 PERB f3074 (1973). 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLO 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
^PUBLIC E M P ^ ^ 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Jamesville-
DeWitt Faculty Association, New York State United Teachers, AFT #2755, 
that the Board of Education of the Jamesville-DeWitt Central School 
District will: 
1. Execute, upon the request of the Association, a 
collective bargaining agreement, effective July 1, 
•1988 to June 30, 1990, embodying the agreement 
reached by the parties on May 24, 1988; and 
2. Negotiate in good faith under the Act with the 
Association. 
JAMESVILLE-DEWITT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
//3A-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3367 
PATCHOGUE-MEDFORD LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the title of Pages. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-3367 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable-times—and^c^^ 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
U*4£cu >. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3B-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
 : - T . - . = i : _ - - _ . . . . - - - . _ - _ . „ 
-and- CASE NO. C-3436 
TOWN OF ATTICA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264, 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3436 page 2 
Unit: Included: Highway Department employees including all 
full-time and regular part-time machine 
operators and the Deputy Highway 
Superintendent. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264, 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
-mZji-tJ? P. A£L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and-
VTLLAGE OF MOUNT KISCO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the titles of Intermediate 
Typists, Intermediate Account Clerk/Typist, and 
Senior Typist. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-3440 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
~faath ~wTith~resp~e^ ^^  
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membeoar 
//3D-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMAN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
TOWN OF FALLSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3520 
TOWN OF FALLSBURG, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Patrolman's Benevolent 
Association, Town of Fallsburg Police Department has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3520 page 2 
Unit: Included: All regular, full-time police dispatchers 
employed by the employer in its South Fallsburg 
Facility. 
Excluded: All other employees of the Town of Fallsburg. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate-collectively- with—the-Patrolman's-Benevolent— T™~ 
Association, Town of Fallsburg Police Department. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
<&& = 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. EiseriBerg, Member / 
#3E-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION OF THE TOMPKINS 
COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3535 
TOMPKINS COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer, 
-and-
TOMPKENS COUNTY LIBRARY UNIT OF TOMPKINS 
COUNTY LOCAL 855, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Support Staff Association of 
the Tompkins County Public Library has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-3535 page 2 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Page, Library Clerk, Cleaner, Senior 
Stenographer, Data Processing Operator, 
Principal Library Clerk, Audio Visual Aide, 
Library Accounts Manager, Senior Library Clerk, 
-
 : - -:-••••--;- - Typist^^nd^LibraryrrAssistant^Tr =====^-===7—-
Excluded: Director, Assistant Director and professional 
library staff. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Support Staff Association 
of the Tompkins County Public Library. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
N£Uo+/(/ f_. lUMn^L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Member^ 
#3_-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAMBURG POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
TOWN OF HAMBURG, 
Employer, 
-and-
SOUTHTOWNS POLICE CLUB, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southtowns Police Club has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3546 
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Unit: Included: All classified competitive Civil Service Police 
Officers in the Town of Hamburg Police 
Department, which includes all Patrolmen, 
Detectives and Detective Sergeants. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, all Captains, all Detective 
Lieutenants, all Lieutenants and all others. 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southtowns Police Club, 
Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
-7V**t4jZ /^ /KUd^t, < ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member { 
#3(3-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNION LOCAL 65, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3383 
VILLAGE OF DRYDEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Union Local 65, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3383 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Union Local 65, International 
-Brotherh^ 
America. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
WZ^S&fsC 4LtT*<< 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3H-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ELLICOTT POLICE UNIT, LOCAL 807, 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY, CSEA, INC., AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
____.__---- —_...--.__.-... -..--..._-_. -- - " - - P e t i t i o n e r : , r—:-:-- .---=•:-.---— -_.:—--—.Trr-—:-.-rr=——.T 
-and- CASE NO. C-3545 
TOWN OF ELLICOTT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Ellicott Police 
Unit, Local 807, Chautauqua County, CSEA, Inc., AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3545 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full-time police officers and sergeants. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Ellicott Police 
Unit^ Eoeal^^ 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^(J^i^J^^u^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
A*^Uc=. y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
\ 
#31-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRAINMASTERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
•T^^7--:•-Tand--^~-T:::T--.-^.-•-•-T::-:-:-:.^"•-•:-=-••^::_- ^ „ C A S E NOi-C-3534:.—-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
) Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Trainmasters Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Ail employees in the title of Trainmaster. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-3534 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Trainmasters Benevolent 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
-faith-wi^h^respect-rto—wages,—hours,-and—other^^ 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
-~"7{w&g£ €• /UMJ^ ^ ^ > 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//3J-9/12/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YORKTOWN SUPERIOR OFFICER'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3531 
TOWN OF YORKTOWN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Yorktown Superior Officer's 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Police Lieutenant. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-3531 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Yorktown Superior Officer's 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer—in—good—fa-ith--w-itdi—respect—to-wages^ rr-hou-rs-,r~and—other---~T~~ 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 12, 1989 
Albany, New York 
' /Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Meml(er 
